Abstract-Cooperative transmission can greatly improve communication system performance by taking advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels. Most previous work on resource allocation for cooperation transmission is based on centralized control. In this paper, we propose two share auction mechanisms, the SNR auction and the power auction, to distributively coordinate the resource allocation among users. We prove the existence, uniqueness and effectiveness of the auction results. In particular, the SNR auction leads to a fair resource allocation among users, and the power auction achieves a solution that is close to the efficient allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cooperative communication concept has recently been proposed [1] , [2] as a means to take advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels by using relays as virtual antennas to provide the advantages of multiple input multiple output (MIMO) transmission. Various cooperative protocols such as amplify-and-forward, decode-and-forward, and estimate-andforward have been proposed (e.g., [1] - [4] ). The work in [5] analyzes cooperative schemes involving dirty paper coding, while energy-efficient transmission is considered for broadcast networks in [6] . In [7] , the authors evaluate cooperativediversity performance when the best relay is chosen according to the average SNR as well as the outage probability of relay selection based on the instantaneous SNR. In [8] , the authors propose a distributed relay selection scheme that requires limited network knowledge and is based on instantaneous SNRs. In [9] , relay section, power management, and subcarrier assignment are investigated for multiuser OFDM networks.
In order to maximize the performance of the cooperative transmission network, we need to consider the global channel information, including those between source-destination, source-relay, and relay-destination. Most existing work in this area is based on centralized control, which requires considerable overhead for signalling and measurement. In this paper, we focus on designing distributed resource allocation algorithms for cooperative networks. In particular, we want to answer the following two questions: 1) "When to relay", i.e., when is it beneficial to use the relay? 2) "How to relay", i.e., how should the relay allocate resources among multiple competing users?
We answer these two questions by designing an auctionbased framework for cooperative resource allocation. Auctions have recently been introduced into several areas of wireless This research was supported by the NSF Grants ANI-03-38807, CCR-02-05214, CNS-06-25637, CCF-0448012, and CCF-0635034, an ONR YIP grant.
communications (e.g., time slot allocation [10] and power control [11] , [12] ). This paper is closely related to the auction mechanisms proposed in [12] , where the authors considered distributed interference management in a cognitive radio network without a relay. In that case, a user can only obtain a positive transmission rate when it obtains some shared system resource. The problem considered here is significantly different due to the existence of the relay and the possibility of achieving a positive transmission rate without using the relay.
We consider two network objectives here: fairness and efficiency. Both might be difficult to achieve even in a centralized fashion. This is because users' rate increases are non-smooth and non-concave in the relay's transmission power, and thus the corresponding optimization problems are non-convex. We propose two auction mechanism, the SNR auction and the power auction, which achieve the desired network objectives in a distributed fashion under suitable technical conditions. In both auctions, each user decides "when to relay" based on a simple threshold policy that is locally computable. The question of "how to relay" is answered by a simple weighted proportional allocation among users who use the relay. Simulation results show that the power auction achieves an average of 95% of the maximum rate increase in a two-user network over a wide range of relay locations. The SNR auction achieves a fair allocation among users but leads to a much lower total rate increase. This reflects a fairness-efficiency tradeoff that can be exploited by a system designer. This paper is organized as follows. The system model and network objectives are given in Section II. In Section III, two share auction mechanisms are proposed, their mathematical properties are analyzed, and mechanisms for achieving auction results in a distributed fashion are shown. Simulation results are discussed in Section IV and conclusions are drawn in Section V. Due to space limitations, all proofs are omitted in this conference version of the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND NETWORK OBJECTIVES

A. System Model
We focus our discussions on the amplify-and-forward (AF) cooperative protocol [2] in this paper. Other cooperation protocols can be analyzed in a similar fashion. The system diagrams are shown in Fig. 1 , where there are one relay node r and a set I = (1, ..., I) of source-destination pairs. We also refer to pair i as user i, which includes source node s i and destination node d i . 
and
where P si represents the transmit power of source s i , X si is the transmitted information symbol with unit energy at Phase 1 at source s i , G si,di and G si,r are the channel gains from s i to destination d i and relay r, respectively, and n di and n r are additive white Gaussian noises. Without loss of generality, we assume that the noise level is the same for all of the links, and is denoted by σ 2 . We also assume that the channels are stable over each transmission frame.
The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at destination
For amplify-and-forward cooperative transmission, in Phase 2 relay r amplifies Y si,r and forwards it to destination d i with transmitted power P r,di . The received signal at destination d i is
where
is the unit-energy transmitted signal that relay r receives from source s i in Phase 1, G r,di is the channel gain from relay r to destination d i , and n ′ di is the received noise at Phase 2. Substituting (2) into (5), we can rewrite (4) as
Using (6), the relayed SNR at destination d i with the help of relay is If user i performs only the direct transmission in Phase 1 (i.e., not using the relay), it achieves a total information rate of
where W is the signal bandwidth. On the other hand, if user i performs the transmissions in both Phases 1 and 2, it can then achieve a total information rate at the output of maximal ratio combining as
The coefficient 1/2 is used to model the fact that cooperative transmission will occupy one out of two phases (e.g., time, bandwidth, code). Since Γ si,r,di is the extra SNR increase compared with the direct transmission, we also denote
Based on (8) and (9), the rate increase that user i obtains by cooperative transmission is
which is nonnegative since the source can always choose not to use the relay and thereby obtain zero rate increase. △R i is a function of the channel gains of the source-destination, sourcerelay and relay-destination links, as well as the transmission power of the source and the relay. In particular, △R i is a nondecreasing, non-smooth, and non-concave function of the relay transmission power P r,di , as illustrated in Fig. 2 . We assume that the source transmission power P si is fixed for each user i, as well as the relay's total power, P . The relay determines the allocation of its transmission power among users, P r (P r,d1 , ..., P r,dI ), such that the total power constraint is not violated, i.e.,
B. Network Objectives: Efficiency and Fairness
We consider two different network objectives: efficiency and fairness. An efficient power allocation P efficient r maximizes the total rate increase of all users by solving the following problem, max P r ∈Pr i∈I
In many cases, an efficient allocation discriminates against users who are far away from the relay. To avoid this, we also consider a fair power allocation P fair r , which solves the following problem
subject to
Here 1 {·} is the indicator function. The intuition behind Problem (14) is that for all users that choose to use the relay, the corresponding △SNR should be maximized subject to the same marginal utility among these users. This can be translated into the minimization of the common marginal utility, due to the concavity of △R i in terms of △SNR i (within the appropriate region). As an example, when the direct transmission SNR Γ si,di is the same for all user i, the constraint in Problem (14) means that △SNR i is the same for all users with positive rate increase. A numerical example of such fair allocation is shown in Section IV. We notice that a fair allocation needs to be Pareto optimal, i.e., no user's rate can be increased without decreasing the rate of another user. However, an efficient or fair allocation need not fully utilize the resource at the relay, i.e., i∈I P r,di can be less than P . This could happen, for example, when the relay is far away from all users so that allowing the relay to transmit half of the time will only decrease the total achievable rate. This is very different from most previous network resource allocation problems (including [12] ), in which the network performance is maximized only if the resource is fully utilized.
Since △R i (P r,di ) is non-smooth and non-concave, it is well known that Problems (13) and (14) are NP hard to solve even in a centralized fashion. In the rest of the paper, we will propose two auction mechanisms that can (approximately) solve these problems under suitable technical conditions in a distributed fashion.
III. SHARE AUCTION
An auction is a decentralized market mechanism for allocating resources in an economy. An auction consists of three key elements: 1) The good, or the resource to be allocated. 2) An auctioneer, who determines the allocation of the good according to the auction rules. 3) A group of bidders, who want to obtain the good from the auctioneer. The interactions and outcome of an auction are determined by the rules, which include four components: 1) The information the auctioneer and bidders know before the auction starts.
2) The bids submitted to the auctioneer by the bidders.
3) The allocation determined by the auctioneer based on the bids. 4) The payments payed by the bidders to the auctioneer as functions of bids and allocations.
In the cooperative network considered here, it is natural to design auction mechanisms in which the good is the relay's total transmit power P , the auctioneer is the relay, and the bidders are the users. One well known auction mechanism that achieves the efficient allocation is the VCG auction [13] . However, the VCG auction requires the relay to gather global network information from the users, and solves I+1 nonconvex optimization problems. This might be too complicated for real-time implementations. To overcome the limitation of the VCG auction, we propose two simpler share auctions, the SNR auction and the power auction. 1 The main advantages of the two proposed auctions in this section are the simplicities of bids and allocation. The rules of the two auctions are described below, with the only difference being in payment determination.
Share Auction (SNR Auction and Power Auction)
• Information: Besides the public and local information (i.e., W, P, σ 2 , P si , G si,di ), each user i also knows the channel gains G si,r and G r,di , either through measurement or explicit feedback from relay r. The relay announces a positive reserve bid β > 0 and a price π > 0 to all users before the auction starts.
• Bids: User i submits bid b i ≥ 0 to the relay.
• Allocation: The relay allocates transmit power according to
• Payments: In an SNR auction, source i pays the relay C i = π △ SNR i . In a power auction, source i pays the relay C i = πP r,di . A bidding profile is defined as the vector containing the users' bids, b = (b 1 , ..., b I ). The bidding profile of user i's opponents is defined as
For notational simplicity, we omit the dependence on β and other system parameters.
If the reserve bid β = 0, then the resource allocation in (15) depends only on the ratio of the bids. A bidding profile kb (for any k > 0) leads to the same resource allocation as b, which is not desirable in practice. That is why we need a positive reserve bid. However, the value of β is not important as long as it is positive. For example, if we increase β to k ′ β, then users can just scale b to k ′ b, which leads to the same resource allocation. For simplicity, we will choose β = 1 in all the simulations in Section IV.
The desirable outcome of an auction is called a Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is a bidding profile b * such that no user wants to deviate unilaterally, i.e.,
Define user i's best response (for fixed b −i and price π) as
which in general could be a set. An NE is also a fixed point solution of all users' best responses. We would like to answer the following four questions for both auctions: 1) When does an NE exist? 2) When is the NE unique? 3) What are the properties of the NE? 4) How can the NE be reached in a distributed fashion?
A. SNR Auction
Let us first determine the users' best responses (e.g., (18)) in the SNR auction, which clearly depend on the price π. 
Both π s i andπ s i can be calculated locally by user i.
Theorem 1:
In an SNR auction, user i's unique best response function is
Ifπ
(Ps i Gs i ,r +σ 2 )σ , user i cannot obtain a positive payoff from the auction no matter what bid it submits, and thus it should simply use direct transmission and achieve a rate of R si,di . As a result,
, user i wants to participate in the auction, and its best response depends how much other users bid (b −i ). When the price is smaller than π s i , user i becomes so aggressive that it demands a large SNR increase that cannot be achieved even of all the resource is allocated to it. This is reflected by an infinite bid in (22). Now consider the case in whichπ s i < π s i . User i either cannot obtain a positive payoff or cannot achieve the desired SNR increase, and thus the best response is either 0 or ∞.
Combining (15) and (22), we know that if an NE exist, the relay power allocated for user i is
and i∈I
The strictly inequality is due to the positive reserve bid β. Next we need to find the fixed point of all users' best responses, i.e., the NE. A trivial case would beπ Unlike the result in [12] , the unique NE in Theorem 2 might not be a continuous function of π, due to the discontinuity of the best response function as shown in Fig. 3 . This has been observed in the simulation results described in Section IV. In particular, the unique NE could be all zero for any price π > π s th , even if the network is SNR-regular. It can be seen that the "marginal utility equalization" property of a fair allocation (i.e., the constraint in Problem (14)) is satisfied at the NE of the SNR auction. However, there always exists some "resource waste" since some power will never be allocated to any user because of the positive reserve bid β. However, by choosing a price π larger than, but very close to, π s th , we could reduce the resource waste to a minimum and approximate the fair allocation. Formally, we define a reduced feasible set parameterized by δ as
(24) Then we can show the following.
Theorem 3: Consider an SNR auction in an SNR-regular network, where f s i (π) is continuous at π s th for each user i, and greater than zero for at least one user. For any sufficiently small δ, there exists a price π s,δ under which the unique NE achieves the fair allocation P fair r with a reduced feasible set P δ r . A sufficiently small δ makes sure that we deal with a regime in which f s i (π) is continuous for any user i. This is also desirable in practice since we want to minimize the amount of resource wasted.
B. Power Auction
The best response function in the power auction is nonlinear and complicated in general. However, in the special case of low SNR where Γ si,di and △SNR i (b i , b −i ) are small for all i, i.e., 
C. Distributed Iterative Best Response Updates
The last question we want to answer is how the NE can be reached in a distributed fashion. Consider the SNR auction as an example. It is clear that the best response function in (22) can be calculated in a distributed fashion with limited information feedback from the relay. However, each user does not have enough information to calculate the best response of other users, which prevents it from directly calculating the NE. Nevertheless, the NE can be achieved in a distributed fashion if we allow the users to iteratively submit their bids based on best response functions.
Suppose users update their bids b (t) at time t according to the best response functions as in (21), based on other users' bids b (t − 1) in the previous time t − 1, i.e.,
where both b (t) and b (t − 1) are column vectors, F s (π) is an I-by-I matrix whose (i, j)th component equals f s i (π), and
Theorem 6: If there exists a unique nonzero NE in the SNR auction, the best response updates in (26) globally and geometrically converge to the NE from any positive b (0).
Similar convergence results can be proved for the power auction.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We first simulate various auction mechanisms for a twouser network. As shown in Fig. 4 , the locations of the two sources (s 1 and s 2 ) and two destinations (d 1 and d 2 ) are fixed at (200m,-25m), (0m,25m), (0m,-25m), and (200m,25m). We fix the x coordinate of the relay node r at 80m and its y coordinate varies within the range [-200m,200m ]. In the simulation, the relay moves along a line. The propagation loss factor is set to 4, and the channel gains are distance based (i.e., time-varying fading is not considered here). The transmit power between a source and its destination is P si = 0.01W for all user i, the noise level is σ 2 = 10 −11 W, and the bandwidth is W = 1MHz. The total power of the relay node is set to P = 0.1W.
In Fig. 5 , we show the total rate increases achieved by two users in three auctions. The VCG auction achieves the efficient allocation by solving three non-convex optimization problems by the relay. For both the SNR auction and the power auction, the resource allocation depends on the choice of price π (but is independent of the reserve bid β). Every point on the curve represents an allocation in which the price is adjusted so that the total resource allocated to both users is more than 0.99P (unless this is not possible). The power auction achieves performance very close to that of the VCG auction. At those locations where the VCG auction achieves a positive rate increase, the power auction achieves a rate increase with an average of 95% of that achieved by the VCG auction. The SNR auction achieves less total rate increases but leads to fair resource allocations when both users use the relay (as can be seen in Fig. 6 ).
In Fig. 6 , we show the individual rate increases of both users in the SNR auction and the power auction. The individual rate increases in the VCG auction are similar to that of the power auction and thus are not shown here. First consider the power auction. Since the relay movement trajectory is relatively closer to source s 2 than to source s 1 , user 2 achieves an overall better performance compared with user 1. In particular, user 2 achieves a peak rate increase of 1.35 bits/Hz when the relay is at location 25m (y-axis), compared with the peak rate increase of 0.56 bits/Hz achieved by user 1 when relay is at location -25m. Things are very different in an SNR auction, where the resource allocation is fair. In particular, since the distance between a source and its destination is the same for both users in our simulation, both users achieve the same positive rate increases when they both use the relay. This is the case when the relay is between locations -60m and 10m. At other locations, users just choose not to use the relay since they cannot both get equal rate increases while obtaining a positive payoff. This shows the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness.
Next, we consider the case in which there are multiple users in the network. To be specific, there are 20 users in the network, with their source nodes and destination nodes randomly and uniformly located within the square field that has the same range of [-150m,150m] on both the x-axis and the y-axis. A single relay is fixed at the location (0m,0m). The total transmission power P of the relay is varied between 0.04 W and 1 W. Figs. 7 and 8 show the corresponding simulation results. Each point in the figures represents results averaged over 100 randomly generated network topologies. With an increasing amount of resource at the relay node, the total network rate increase improves in both auctions (as seen in Fig. 7) , and the power auction achieves higher rate increase than the SNR auction. Fig. 8 shows the variance of the rate increase (among the users with positive rate increase), and it is clear that the SNR auction achieves a fair resource allocation as indicated by the almost zero variance in all cases.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Cooperative transmission can greatly improve communication system performance by taking advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels and cooperation among users. In this paper, we have proposed two share auction mechanisms, the SNR auction and the power auction, to distributively coordinate the relay power allocation among users. We have proven the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in both auctions. Under suitable conditions, the SNR auction achieves the fair allocation, while the power auction achieves the efficient allocation. Simulations results for both two-user and multiple-user networks have been used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the auction mechanisms. In particular, the power auction achieves an average of 95% of the maximum rate in the two-user case under a wide range of relay locations, and the SNR auction leads to a performance improvement having small variation among users. 
